Cornell Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 1 December 1929

Article 2

Officiousness
Edward W. Hope

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Edward W. Hope, Officiousness, 15 Cornell L. Rev. 25 (1929)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol15/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

OFFICIOUSNESSt
EDWARD W. HoPE*
PART I.

DEFINITIONS AND PRINCIPLES

I. Contrast between the Roman and the English law: "There are few
persons for whom the common law has so little kindness as for the
voluntary intermeddler in other persons' affairs. Not even equity
will aid a volunteer, we are told. A person by unsolicited interference may incur liabilities, but scarcely obtain rights, as when an
intermeddler with the property of an estate becomes executor de son
tort. In the Roman law it was quite otherwise. A volunteer, who
believed in good faith that the interests of an absent friend were
in danger of suffering by neglect, might act for him."' This doctrine
of the Roman law is found under the title "Negotiorum Gestio", and
its significance is best seen from the following excerpt: "[I]f one man
has managed the business of another during the latter's absence, each
can sue the other by the action on uncommissioned agency; the
direct action being available to him whose business was managed,
the contrary action to him who managed it. It is clear that these
actions cannot properly be said to originate in a contract, for their
peculiarity is that they lie only where one man has come forward and
managed the business of another without having received any commission to do so, and that other is thereby laid under legal obligation
even though he knows nothing of what has taken place. The reason
of this is the general convenience; otherwise people might be summoned away by some sudden event of pressing importance, and without commissioning any one to look after and manage their affairs,
the result of which would be that during their absence those affairs
would be entirely neglected: and of course no one would be likely to
attend to them if he were to have no action for the recovery of any
outlay he might have incurred in so doing."12 The commonest exiThis article will appear in the CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY in two installments,
the second in the February issue.
*Professor of Law, University of South Dakota.
1RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW (1927) 301-2.
2

JUSTINIAN, INST. lib. III, tit. xxvii, § I.

Further references: BUCKLAND, A

TEXT-Boox OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN (1921) 533-5; HoWE,
STUDIES IN THE CrVIL LAW (2d ed. 19o5) 176-8; MACHELDEY, HANDBOOK OF THE

ROMAN LAW (Dropsie's ed. 1883) §§ 491-5; MELVILLE, A MANUAL OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW (3d ed. 1921) §§ 147-9; RADIN, op. cit. supranote I,
at 3oi-3; SCOTT, CASES ON QUASI-CONTRACTS (1905) 1-4, I6, 18, 37-41, and
4o-I, n.; 2 SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD (1917) §§ 810-II;
WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW (2d ed. 1912) 26o; WOODWARD, THE
LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS (1913) § 191. It is essential to note that the resultant
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ample was where B is abroad, and his property is about to be seized
by another claimant, or a mortgage foreclosed against him. A steps
in and saves B's property.
In contrast to this free, encouraged, and rewarded helpfulness of
the Roman law we have the rather dour individualism of the English
law expressed by Bowen, L. J., in Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins.
Co.: "The general principle is, beyond all question, that work and
labor done or money expended by one man to preserve or benefit the'
property of another do not according to English law create any lien
upon the property saved or benefited, nor, even if standing alone,
create any obligation to repay the expenditure. Liabilities are not
to be forced upon people behind their backs any more than you can
confer a benefit upon a man against his will." 3
Taking this language at its face value, it does not contrast or
differentiate the two legal systems, since the Roman law no less than
the English forbade anything in the nature of concealment or force
in the gestor's act, which indeed must have been open or overt, and
not expressly forbidden by the other party. Lord Bowen's real intent
was to deny the Roman rule any application in the English law,
except in the case of salvage, and of general average contribution.
His idea would have been more clearly expressed if he had affirmed
in milder, but more far-reaching terms, that our law will never
imply or raise a promise by the recipient to pay for a benefit retained,
unless it was requested, or unless there was an agreement that it
should be paid for. So painted, his picture would have been a black
4
and white contrast, whatever might be thought of its truth to nature.
obligation is purely quasi contractual, not contractual. The service rendered by
the gestor (actor) might be of any kind, but it must have been a reasonable act,
and in the circumstances, reasonable for the gestor to do it, rather than to leave
it for the principal to do. It must have been useful and necessary at the time it
was done, or accepted as such by the principal. It must have been done in the
interest of the principal. If it was also in the interest of the gestor, he could
recover only if he could not have protected his own interest without intervening
in the other's affairs. It must not have been prohibited by the principal, that is,
forced upon him. It must have been done with the intent at the time to charge
the principal for it. It must not have been done as a pious duty, or at the mandate of the principal, or because of legal duty to him. Lorenzen, The Negotiorum
Gestio in Roman and Modern Civil Law (1927) 13 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 190;
Heilman, The Rights of the Voluntary Agent Against His Principalin Roman Law
and in Anglo-American Law (1926) 4 TENN. L. Rnv. 34, 76.
334 Ch. D. 234, 248 (1886).
4
Though unfortunately many cases may be marshaled in support of such a
view, it would be too hasty an assumption to conclude that it is the undisputed
law in England and the United States. Within one year after Bowen's decision
an American author said: "Any benefit, of a sort commonly the subject of
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The fact is, on the contrary, that the Anglo-American law, while it
has not incorporated into itself the rule of negotiorum gestio in its
entirety, is not hostile to it in principle. In agreement with the
large equitable spirit animating that doctrine and expressed in the
rule of natural justice that "no one ought unjustly to enrich himself at
the expense of another," it will in not a few instances of what has
been called "dutiful intervention ' 5 create a promise to render back
equivalent value for a benefit thus received. It is believed that this
hospitable tendency, and a leaning toward the equities of each given
case, is growing, though it still has to struggle through an age-long
incrustation of hard and fast precedent, frequent misconception of
the proper principles applicable, and general rule-of-thumb procedure.
2. As to the meaning of the term "officiousness" and like words as used
by the courts: Has this term any definite legal content, such as for
example highway robbery has, or is it a colloquial word employed
by the courts with all the variety of meanings, unpredictability of
application, and disparity of judgment to be expected of informal
usage? It seems to be taken for granted that its meaning is clear
and well known to all, since as far as observed, no judge has given
an ex cathedra definition of its legal import. Of the standard English
dictionaries, Webster's New International says it means: "Volunteering, or disposed to volunteer, one's services where they are neither
asked nor needed; meddlesome; obtruding one's services or assistance
where not needed. Offering unwelcome courtesies."
Century
Dictionary: "Forward in tendering services; interposing uninvited in
the affairs of others; meddling; obtrusive." Oxford Dictionary:"Unduly forward in tendering services; doing or prone to do more than
is asked or required." StandardDictionary: "Excessively forward in
kindness; importunately interposing service not desired or asked."
In these definitions there are four key-ideas of apparently equal
importance: unrequested, forced, unbeneficial, unnecessary. In all
there is the flavor of what is unwelcome, distasteful to the recipient.
But on the other hand, if the gestor's services are welcome, they
pecuniary compensation, which one, not intending it as a gift, confers on another
who accepts it, is, in the absence of any agreement in fact, an adequate foundation
for the law's created promise to render back its value." BISHOP, CONTRACTS
(1887) § 217. In a note the author says of this statement: "In the nature of the
law, this proposition, like multitudes of others which every competent law-writer
introduces into his text-book, is not sustainable by a reference to any single
authority ....
It is held, in the several cases, fragment by fragment; and only
by putting together the fragments, and permitting the law's reasons to give
them adherence, can we discover it as a compact whole."
5
WOODWARD, op. cit. supra note 2, § 191.
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cannot in any true sense be said to be obtruded or forced; if necessary
or beneficial, they cannot be superfluous or undesired; and this is
true whether they have or have not been requested. One does not
act unwarrantably or unreasonably or obtrusively by merely voluntarily (i.e. of his own motion-spontaneously-without request or
compulsion of any sort) doing for another what that other finds
useful or necessary to himself. Such a one cannot in any accurate
sense be said to be forcing his service on another "behind his back"
or "in spite of his teeth" or "against his will," although it may have
been rendered without his knowledge, and without his express or
tacit request or consent. No one who derives pleasure or profit or
is saved from loss by another's action would call the actor officious,
and if he would not, why. should a court?
A search through eight law dictionaries and Words and Phrases
(Series 1, 2, 3) has failed to disclose a single occurrence of the term
"officious," and it is rarely found in the indexes of law books old or
new. Of rare occurrence i law dictionaries are the equivalent
nouns, "meddler" and "intermeddler," though they are given in
Words and Phrases. The term "interloper" is occasionally used in
the sense of officious person by the, courts, but, it would seem,
improperly.6 , "Stranger" is now being used frequently, but the word
most often employed by the courts at present is "volunteer."' 7 Not
infrequently it seems to be employed as a synonym for officious
person or intermeddler, but this does not seem to discriminate
sufficiently. A volunteer would properly be one who acts for another
without being requested and without being induced to do so by mistake or compulsion of any sort.8 A volunteer would not necessarily
be officious, and there is decided advantage in distinguishing between the two words. 9 It cannot be said that the use of this word
"volunteer" is any more definite or precise than is the case with
'"officiousness."
Of "volunteer" Pomeroy says: "The term is used to designate one
who, acting upon his own initiative, pays the debt of another without invitation, compulsion, or the necessity of self-protection...
The term is applied somewhat indiscriminately in the reports to
6

See BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY, where it is defined as one who interrupts the
trade of a company of merchants by pursuing the same business with them in
the same place without lawful authority.
77 WDS. & PHR. (3d Ser.) 899 gives a considerably increased space to this word.
8

WooDwARD, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2io.

9

See supra p. 27, and KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS
(I893) 351, 388, where the author with this purpose in mind uses the expression
"officious volunteer."
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almost anyone who applies for subrogation and is refused, no matter
what the reason be, so that many statements of the courts are
misleading."' 10 Black's Law Dictionary says of it: "A person who
gives his services without any express or implied promise of remuneration in return is called a 'volunteer', and is entitled to no remuneration
for his services, nor to any compensation for injuries sustained by
him in performing what he has undertaken." If "implied" here
means "tacit," the definition discards quasi-contract; if it means
"implied by law," it, in conformity with Pomeroy's definition, means
that a volunteer is one for whom neither the law nor equity will
raise a promise or decree subrogation. It becomes, like "officiousness," a sort of tag or term of defeat."
3. As to the origin of the idea of officiousness: There seem to be
two main causes for the appearance of this idea in the English law,
which may be discussed separately. Yet they are, probably, only
different aspects of the same thing, one being the cause or the effect
of the other, though which is cause and which is effect seems hard
to say. These causes may be stated as follows:
(a) Self-direction or personal autonomy is a mark of the English
race. The Englishman, as opposed to one of Latin lineage, does not
so easily coalesce with the mass. He distinctly wishes to ,live his
own life, make his own contacts, or as he frequently says, "muddle
through" in his own way. He dislikes volunteered offerings-even
of a conversational sort. Interference with his choice or freedom of
movement is resented. This is familiar enough to travelers and
students of English life and letters, and what is in English life will
necessarily also exist in English law, 12 a notable example having
already been given in Lord Bowen's decision above. It is an affair
of national temperament.
105 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 2348, and note.
"The increase of late in the use of "volunteer" may indicate a more frequent
resort to courts of equity, and a convenient disposition of such cases under the
rule "equity will not assist a volunteer." This maxim is of common application
to the other regular situation where "volunteer" means one who receives a
voluntary (gratuitous) conveyance. Possibly there has been some confusion in
the application of the maxim.
12 if support were needed for this suggestion of temperamental "slant", it has
lately been amusingly given by a French writer noted for the keen and accurate
view he has in this matter: In the (June, 1929) AmT. MONTHLY, M. Andr6 Maurois
writes On Living in England-Informal Suggestions to a Young Frenchman. He
says: "Above all, don't be what the English call 'fussy'. Wait until you are
requested [italics mine] to do things; don't rush into the breach." Here we have
the Roman doctrine of negotiorum gestio and the English rule of "mind your own
business" in perfect contrast.
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Whether this national trait of the English continues to exist in full
force in the polyglot nation which America has become, with its
masses of people of Latin and Germanic birth and descent, whose
instincts are, probably, more in accord with the spirit of the Roman
law in this respect, is doubtful. If law tends in time to reflect the
life of the people, it might be expected that decisions of our courts
should veer away from the sharp individualism that marks the
English cases. The conditions of modern life also tend strongly in
the same direction.
(b) The other cause spoken of is the early and long enduring
supremacy of the contract concept and the sacredness attached to
"privity of contract."' 3 A man was not obligated to another unless
a formal or express contract could be spelled out. He need not
remunerate another for a benefit unless he had requested the benefit
beforehand, and it became the consideration of his express promise
to pay for it. Later, his promise came to be inferred, i.e. implied in
fact, but this is still true contract. As long as persons kept within
the boundaries of their contract in rendering services or giving values
of any kind there could, obviously, be no such thing as officiousness.
Contract excludes officiousness, because every thing done is under
the sanction of request or consent that it should be done.
Invited action alone commanded remuneration because contract
was the only known instrument of obligation, at least, of positive
obligation as opposed to negative. Quasi contracts, or contracts
implied in law, were long in coming to England, were at the time of
their coming little understood, and have continued to be little
understood from that day down to the present both in England and
in America. 14 Before Lord Mansfield's time (1705-1793), and es-

"See CAluDozo, THE GROWTH OF LAW (1924) 76-8; Ames, The History of
Assumpsit (1888) 2 HARV. L. REv. 63.
' 4Late cases in this country are to be found still carefully explaining the difference between real (true) contracts and quasi contracts. See Miller v. Schloss,
218 N. Y. 4oo, 113 N. E. 337 (1916); City of New York v. Davis, 7 F. (2d) 566,
573 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925): "The action is based on quasi-contract, and it is no
defense to such an action to allege that the parties did not contract." See I
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 3; 40 CYC.2807; 13 C. J. 244. The confusion
as to the difference spoken of is perhaps contributed to by the fact that writers
on contracts are still in the habit of incorporating in their books summary treatments of quasi contracts as a part of the subject of contracts. Much of the present
ignorance about quasi contracts may be attributed directly to the fact that our
digest system, otherwise admirable, has no separate heading under that name.
This not only casts the subject into darkness for bench and bar, but for writers
it enforces the Herculean task of searching for the membra disjecta over the whole
surface of the law.
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pecially before his decision of the 'case of Moses v. Macferlan,15 all
positive, as opposed to negative, or tortious legal obligations were
customarily treated as contracts 6 and as requiring mutual assent to
be valid. This assent could be expressed in words, but it could
equally well be established from conduct. Assents of the latter kind
are better termed "tacit" contracts and are, of course, real contracts.
Unfortunately, they were called "implied" contracts as a short name
for "implied in fact" contracts. It seems probable that Lord Mansfield was the first to introduce thoroughly the principle of quasi
contract into the English law, bringing it over from the Roman law,
but Adam Smith (1723-1790) lectured, and John Austin (1790-1859)
wrote about them, as did Sir Henry Maine (1822-1888). The "contract" part of their name caused them to be confused with true formal
contracts, and this confusion became worse confounded when they
also were further referred to as "implied contracts" and were thus
confused with "tacit" (true) contracts, although quasi contracts are
in no sense whatever contracts, as they neither have nor need the
mutual assent. of the parties, the law alone creating the consent.
It will thus be seen that the idea of what the courts call "officiousness" took root and spread through our law from what were really
four sources: (x) the temperamental dislike of the English people for
voluntary intervention of others in their private affairs; (2) the fact
that contract for centuries was the sole source of obligation, and the
feeling that any approach without or beyond the terms of a contract
was unwarrantable; and as subsidiary to this (a) the strangeness of
quasi contract, with its equitable make-up, demanding that the law
should supply the consent where unjust enrichment would result
without it, and (b) the confusion resulting from the use of the term
"implied" to cover both tacit and quasi contracts.
We are now in a better position to see why it is that, while the
standard usage of the language as evidenced by the leading dictionaries 17 plainly requires that correctly to term an act officious it must
be non-beneficial and unnecessary, as well as unrequested, many
courts, instead of giving due weight and effect to the first two adjectives, have thrown them out of the count, and have adopted a
lopsided scale by singling out and giving exclusive effect to the element of request. This is a lingering disease of which the symptoms
are a fixed idea for contract and a "blind-spot" for quasi contract.
On the other hand, the Roman law, placing the problem correctly in
%

Burr. IOO5 (176o).

6

Ames, op. cit. supranote 13.

17Supra p. 27.
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quasi contract, and not touching contract at any point, proceeds on
the ground that request or consent of the beneficiary, or even notice
to him that the act is being done, is quite unnecessary, 8 provided
that the act itself is useful and necessary, and reasonable under the
circumstances. To insist on contract here as a foundation for recovery is to refuse recognition and enforcement of quasi contractual
principles. Contract emphasizes the rights of the defendant (B, the
beneficiary) and slights consideration of the rights of the plaintiff
(A, the intervenor), while quasi contract works in the opposite
direction.
4. Is offiiousness a tort?: Suppose A by the application of all
reasonable rules ought to be deemed officious. Is he therefore also
a tort-feasor? In Sloan v. Ry.,19 the regular brakeman on a train of
defendant, B, when going on a vacation, asked plaintiff, A, to take
his place. A did so with the knowledge of C, the conductor in
charge, and while performing the work was injured. Held, that he
can recover from the railroad, as the conductor had authority to
employ necessary help in an emergency, and therefore A was neither
a trespasser nor an intermeddler. The court said: "An intermeddler
is a person who officiously intrudes into a business to which he has
no right. The distinction between an intermeddler and a trespasser
' 20
is not in any case very great.
Where A enters upon the property of B, if the act is wrong at all,
it is necessarily a trespass. It is superfluous to determine if he is
also intermeddling. There is no such tort known to the law as
intermeddling. In the Sloan case above it is not said that the two
things are synonymous but that they are only more or less alike.
This is obiter dictum. It is submitted that they are different. A
trespasser is always a defendant, while an intervenor, unless he has
injured where he was trying to benefit, is always a plaintiff. The
motive and intent of the acts are different. A conscious trespasser
intends injury, or at least is seeking some personal satisfaction or
gain, while the trespasser who is unconscious of trespass and acts in
good faith is at least negligent. Benefit to the other party is not his
object-certainly no benefit results. On the other hand, the intervenor, though officious, means to benefit the other. A failure to
confer benefit will by itself defeat any claim he might make to
reward, both in the Roman and English law of quasi contract.
Trespass is an inherently wrongful act,2 ' and while it is true that our
18

Police Jury v. Hampton, 5 Mart. N. S. 389 (La. 1827).
Iowa 728, I6 N. W. 331 (1883).
OSupra note 29, at 736, 16 N. W. at 334.
2CHAPiN, TORTS (1917) 64-67.
1962
2
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law does not encourage intermeddling, its attitude towards it is
negative merely: officiousness simply throws out of gear the working
of the rule of unjust enrichment. Officiousness has never, so far as
known to the writer, been declared an inherently wrongful act; and
therefore the rule that good motive will not make lawful an in22
herently wrongful act has no application.
In view of the above, it is here affirmed that our law is inconsistent
in its dealing with trespass and officiousness. Trespass is an inherent
wrong; yet if A in good faith (unconsciously) trespasses on B's land,
takes B's timber, and very greatly increases its value by manufacture,
A, when sued, may keep the value he has added, though it was done
tortiously throughout. 23 There is even some judicial argument that a
conscious trespasser who wholly changes B's article into a thing of
different species may gain title to the new thing, and hence to its
increased value. 24 If in a trespass case, A being inherently a wrongdoer, the law can because of the mere creation of value overlook as
2Other cases similar to the Sloan case, and, like it, involving actual trespass on
real property are: McCarroll v. Stafford, 24 Ark. 224 (1866); G. B. & L. Ry. v.
Eagles, 9 Colo. 544, 13 Pac. 696 (1887); Aga v. Harbach, 127 Iowa 144, 102
N. W. 833 (I9O5), where it was said that if A in good faith and on merely apparent
(as opposed to real or intended) authority of B's servant enters upon B's property
and there works for B, he is neither a trespasser nor intermeddler, this conclusion
being regarded by the court as the general consensus of opinion; Cubit v. O'Dett,
5i Mich. 347, 351, 16 N. W. 679, 680 (1883); Bruch v. Carter, 32 N. J. L. 554
(1867); Ketcham v. Cohn, 2 Misc. 427, 22 N. Y. Supp. 181 (1893), where it is
held wrongful for A to go upon B's land againstB's wishes to shore up B's building, the court saying (note that the decision is given "with reluctance"), that
which is essentially a trespass cannot become lawful by being done with good
intentions; Vassor v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 142 N. C. 68, 54 S. E. 849 (I9O6),
where it was held that B's conductor had no authority to employ (two judges
dissenting) so that A was neither a passenger nor employee, yet it was not held
that A was a trespasser or intermeddler; Anon., Y. B. 21 Hen. VIII, 27 (circ.
1530), where it was held to be a trespass for A to go on B's land, take B's corn,
and put it into B's barn, in order to save it from being eaten by cattle. It is
submitted that the above decisions prove nothing as to the nature of officiousness
when not united with trespass.
nDetroit Steel Co. v. Sisterville Brewing Co., 233 U. S. 712, 34 Sup. Ct. 753
(1914); Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311 (1871); Isle Royal Mining Co. v.
Hertin, 37 Mich. 332 (1877). There are some cases contra. See Arnold, The Law
of Accession of Personal Property (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 103.
24
Dissenting opinion of Bronson, C. J., in Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379
(185o). Quaere: If A knowingly and wrongfully took B's canvas of the value of
ten cents and painted on it a $Io,ooo painting, would not A be held to have
acquired title to the canvas? It is believed he would. An extreme case, such as
this, has apparently not yet been decided. See BUCKLAND, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 210-212.
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mere form an infraction of the law, and consider, as the substantial
and important thing, the increase of value, why should the law not
follow the same principle where A is merely officious, and give first
consideration to the benefit which A has conferred on B? Yet we
are told that however great the benefit given, the officious intermeddler shall get nothing for his pains.
The same inconsistency is observable in the more lenient treatment
accorded to A where he confuses his goods with B's. True, by the
most savage rule, if A is a wilful confuser-the masses being of
unequal value-A forfeits his contribution, though there is a possibility of apportionment; but other cases hold there is no forfeiture
unless A's part is of inferior quality.2 Even here, if A can point out
his property, there is well founded argument that he should not lose
it.28 If the goods were of equal value, though the confusion were
tortious, some cases hold there is no forfeiture.27 If A is a good-faith
trespasser and confuses his goods with B's, both lots being of equal
28
value, A does not forfeit.
If the law has established different grades of trespass to be determined by the trespasser's state of mind at the time of the trespass,
that is, the motive and intent with which the act was done, why is
it not possible and desirable to have different grades of officiousness,
calling one kind "excusable" and the other "inexcusable," and allowing a recovery for one and denying it for the other? It seems hardly
reasonable for the same court to hold that the motive and intent of A
can be allowed to work to his advantage when A is a tort-feasor and
has not benefited B, and yet to hold that A's motive and intent cannot be allowed to work to his advantage when he is merely officious
and has actually benefited B. Therefore to the objection already
made that the word "officiousness" has a lopsided meaning in our
law because of the historical theory that contract is required for
justifiable dealings between persons, and to the second objection
that, in view of the origin of the idea and its individualistic philosophy
and rather narrow legalism, it is probably out of harmony more or
less with the views of a large body of present American society-are
to be added a third and a fourth objection: the ambiguous place
25

Jenkins v. Steanka, 19 Wis. 139 (1865).
21St. Paul Boom Co. v. Kemp, 125 Wis. I38, o3 N. W. 259 (19o).
27
Claffin v. Continental Jersey Works, 85 Ga. 27, n1 S. E. 721 (189o); Page v.
Jones, 26 N. M. 195, 19o Pac. 541 (1920). See 2 IENT, CoMM. *365; (1917)
2 MINN. L. REV. 224.
28
Hesseltine v. Stockwell, 30 Me. 237 (1849). But see the argument on con-

fusion in its bearing on officiousness built up by the court in In re Leslie, 23 Ch. D.
552 (1883).
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assigned to officiousness in our legal system, and the excessive rigor
with which it is punished, as compared with the way a real tort such
as trespass is treated.
5. The doctrine of officiousness versus Christian ethics: Any one
who happens to remember Blackstone's statement to the general
effect that the law of England is based in the main upon the Christian
system of morals will be struck by this curious divergence from the
latter presented by the doctrine under discussion. When A benefits
B because from considerations of self-service or self-protection he is
obliged to do so, A's act is justified, and A is not to be deemed
officious. But when A voluntarily confers the same benefit, acting
from the merely altruistic motive of helping B out of a difficulty, he
is very apt to be held an intermeddler. That is, if A's main motive
is to help himself, and the benefit to B is unavoidable and merely
incidental, A can recover from B; but if his sole motive and intent
is to help B, he can recover from no one. The Roman law squarely
opposes the English at this point: it favors the altruistic action and
looks askance at the self-regarding act,2 9 while the English law frowns
upon the altruistic action, and lauds the self-regarding act. The
Roman mind is here closer to traditional ethics than is the English.
Some writers have of late been defining officious action in terms
of "reasonableness" and would say that an act is not officious if it is
"reasonable." This has possibilities of help, since it is a step toward
the known and tangible. The Roman courts also demanded that
A's act should be reasonable. 0 It affords some basis for thought and
some invitation for improvement, which can in no sense be claimed
for the blind test of "request." Naturally, there will still be difficulties.
It still remains to define what is reasonable, but that is a familiar
difficulty with which -the courts have long dealt, and with, on the
whole, satisfactory results, since the facts and the equities of each
case can be given a hearing. However, under a view largely prevalent
in our courts, the substitution of "reasonable" for non-officious would
necessarily result in this form of creed: It is reasonable for A to
benefit B, though unrequested to do so, whenever A is forced to do
this for his own protection, but otherwise it is unreasonable, although
it may be acting like a Christian for A so to act. But putting the
law thus in bare-faced opposition to what is at least the professed
moral code is not a pleasant thing to have to do, and the courts
naturally do not like to be placed in the position of doing it. A way
out of the difficulty, therefore, is quite often seized upon by which
29

Supra note 2. See also HowE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 273-4.
BUCKLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 533.

"Supra note 2. See
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neither Christianity, the law, nor the requirement of privity of contract is sacrificed or opposed one to the other. This way of handling
the matter is by means of:
6. The "irrebuttablepresumption" that A intended to make a gift of
his benefit to B: With all due deference to those who think otherwise,
it is the opinion of the writer that in cases of this sort there should
never be an irrebuttable presumption of gift except, perhaps, in the
case of services rendered each other by closely related members of a
family living together. In all other cases the jury should determine
A's intention from the facts. It is not apprehended that any harm
could result from trying these cases on their merits. In salvage cases
no such presumption is drawn, and salvage represents in our law the
purest strain of quasi contract principles:3' In principle and logic,
it is impossible to make the common law distinction between property
in danger of destruction on the sea and property so threatened on
the land. Here again, the mere accident that England is a small
island, and that consequently her maritime traffic was always great
and of supreme importance, seems indeed a weak reason for further
perpetuating an arbitrary distinction born of local needs and conditions that have no parallel in a country of continental proportions
like the United States, where sea traffic certainly does not outweigh
that on land in either bulk or importance.
The fact that property is located on water gives it no greater value
or importance than if it were on land, nor is it any reason why its
owner should prefer it to be saved, nor why public policy should be
considered to be better served in such a case. On the contrary, in
both cases equally, sound public policy shouldrequire that reasonable
action by A in saving B's property should be encouraged and suitably
rewarded. Since the burden of showing both the necessity of his
action and its benefit to B is always on A, and, furthermore, since A
can never hope to recover more than the reasonable value of his
expenditure-never exceeding its value to B-and with the certainty of having to pay the costs if he fail to show real merit, it is
not to be reasonably anticipated that a policy thus carefully limited
would breed overnight a nation of busy-bodies anxious to perform
useless and meddlesome services for others and to try their luck
with the courts.
31"Strictly, Quasi-Contracts are acts done by one man to his own inconvenience
for the advantage of another, but without the authority of the other, and, consequently, without any promise on the part of the other to indemnify him or
reward him for his trouble. Instances: Negotiorum Gestio, in the Roman Law;
Salvage, in the English.... The basis is, to incite to certain useful actions. If
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The "irrebuttable presumption" of an intended free service is
drawn most frequently where A saves B's property, and where A
(not being a professional physician, surgeon, or nurse) saves B's life,
health, or limb. It is affirmed, or suggested, by Professor Woodward12 that the courts, in conformity with the common law view,
base their use of this presumption either upon considerations of
public policy or upon kn6wledge of normal human conduct. At
another point, the same writer says :"'"Although instances of benefits
conferred by dutiful intervention in another's affairs are probably as
frequent as those of benefits conferred by mistake, or compulsion,
the topic is reduced to a comparatively narrow compass by the
fact 4 that in most cases of such intervention, the benefit is conferred
without expectation of compensation, and there is consequently no
injustice in the retention of the benefit.""5
There is, it is submitted, no good reason for dealing with these
cases in this, as it may be termed, "steam-roller" fashion. It seems
to be, really, a rather uncandid way of proceeding. The court,
perhaps shutting its eyes to good evidence to the contrary, gratuitously attributes to A the high Christian virtue of a pure altruism
that he never claimed and does not want attributed to him. On
the contrary, A wants a reasonable return on his effort for B, and if
he has not been inexcusably officious, he should have that, and not
the principles were not admitted at all, such actions would not be performed so
often as they are. If pushed to a certain extent, it would lead to inconvenient
and impertinent intermeddling, with the view of catching reward." AusTIN.
LECTURs
oN JURiSPRUDENcE (3d ed. I832) 944.
32
WOODWARD, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 201, 207.
nIbid. § 199.
4
Italics are the writer's.
3
50ne must venture only with great diffidence to question anything Professor
Woodward says on his chosen subject, but with deference it is suggested that the
absence of any evidence of A's intention to charge B for service in any particular
case is not equivalent to the fact of there being no such intention on his part.
It would manifestly be impossible for any one to say in what proportion the
cases where A intends a gift, stand to those cases where he had an actual intent
to charge. It is the very fact of the "narrow compass" to which these cases of
possibly dutiful intervention have been reduced by the employment of the
"irrebuttable presumption," and the turning away from any evidence of A's
intent that there may be, that the present writer thinks a cause of complaint
and a reason for just criticism of the courts. If it be true, as suggested, that the
courts proceed upon their knowledge of normal human nature, nevertheless the
presumption, it is submitted, should not be irrebuttable, but should be at the
most a rebuttable one, to take care of the abnormal cases among the public.
Again, with all respect, it may be claimed on the basis of what seems to be rather
general experience that it is quite as normal, human nature being what it is, to
want something for nothing as it is to want nothing for something.
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words of commendation for a virtue he does not profess. It really
has the effect of punishing A, just as much as if upon satisfactory
evidence the court had found him to have been officious and denied
him a recovery on that ground. And yet A is, excluding officiousness,
not blameworthy in intending merely an advance of his time, labor,
or money in B's interest, rather than an outright gift of these.
Surely one has a right to measure the extent of what he is willing to
do for another without being made to forfeit what he has given on the
pretext that he intended to give wholly without return. To make A
forfeit to B the worth of his benefit in this way is to apply the same
rule as is invoked for illegal contracts; it leaves the parties where the
law finds them. It is hardly an answer to say, as some courts do
that the common law deals with and defines legal duties, not moral.
Moral duties are defined and enforced in a different forum.36 Since
Mansfield's time it is not only a rule of nature but of the common
law, abundantly vouched for, that "Jure naturaeaequum est, neminem
cum alterius detrimento et injuriafierilocupletiorem." As a matter of
fact, the real effect of the presumption is to bring about just what
the courts declare they cannot do: it enforces a counsel of perfection
of the Christian religion in favor of B, a man who wants something
for nothing, against A, who has benefited him. However convenient
this technique may be for a prompt disposition of cases which oftentimes are, doubtless, full of difficulties, it can hardly be commended
as an avenue of approach, if well considered justice is the thing to be
striven for.
7. Emergency as justifying intervention: Closely connected with
the presumption of gift, discussed in the preceding section, is the
significance of an emergency in B's affairs as affecting A's liberty or
duty of intervening. Webster defines emergency as "An unforeseen
occurrence or combination of circumstances which calls for immediate
action or remedy; pressing necessity; exigency" or "crisis." As was
the case with the presumption of gift, so emergency is most often
considered in cases where B's life, health, limb, or property are in
critical danger of harm or destruction. While emergency undoubtedly
tends to absolve A's intervention from the fault of officiousness, it
offers the courts their greatest opportunity to use the presumption
of a gratuity. 7 The result is that, precisely in those bases where B
36

CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928) 14-25; HOCKING, LAw
AND
RIGHTS (1926) 55, 56.
37
WooDwAID, op. cit. supra note 2, § 207: "This presumption that the service
is gratuitously rendered may properly be invoked, it would seem, only in cases
of sudden emergency, as where property is about to be destroyed by fire." He
cites Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 28 (N. Y. 1822), as such a case, and
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stands most in need of assistance, and where A's help will most
certainly go unrebuked for officiousness, there A if he gives aid at
all, must expect to give it for nothing. This is not the Roman law's
idea of the best way to secure the general convenience. Some value
in return for value received was thought to be a helpful stimulant to
sluggish human nature, and nothing to be ashamed of.
Professor James Barr Ames, in his essay on Law and Morals,3" makes
some interesting suggestions. He hopes the time may come when the
law will be moral enough to punish criminally a man who stands by
and sees another drown without moving to save him, and would
further make him pay money to the widow and children. To extend
his suggestion, if A's failure to act benevolently toward B is to be a
reason for A's paying money, is not A's active benevolence toward B
a good reason for B's paying money? The Roman law does not
complicate and obfuscate the problem by talk of emergency and
non-emergency cases, any more than it talks of gratuities or officiousness. The only thing there considered is: Was the act done for B's
benefit a reasonable act for A to do under the circumstances, and was
it useful and necessary to B? If it was, that is the end of the story.
In the work of simplifying the law, now progressing, it is to be hoped
that the whole doctrine of officiousness will be thoroughly overhauled
and cleared of the barnacles and seaweed attaching to it."
But why should a crisis in B's affairs let A in with any more
propriety than where B's property will be lost to him through the
apparently approves the decision denying A recovery. But see KEENER, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 354-6, where he says in effect that, if the case means that A's
actual intention to be paid is to be disregarded in these cases, it goes too far.
Keener therefore seems to be somewhat more hostile to the presumption than
Woodward is, since he denies it aplace even in emergency cases. If we substitute
flood for fire, Glenn v. Savage, i4 Ore. 577, 13 Pac. 442 (1887) is the same sort
of case in facts and holding as the Bartholomew case.
38
AmEs, LECTURES ON LEGAL. HISTORY (1913) 450-451. See also CARDOZO,
supra note 36, at 25; 26, n.58; 47; STAAIMLER, THE THEORY op JUsTIcE (Mod.
Leg. Phil. Ser. 1925) 253; POUND, LAW AND MORALS (1924) 71-75.
39
What has just been said of the simplicity of the Roman law was said with
the case ofPolice jury v. Hampton, supra note 18, in mind. It must be noted,
however, that after the Civil War this old law of Louisiana was changed. And
even before that, in Watson v. Ledoux, 8 La. Ann. 68 (1853), it was held that in
cases of fire and flood "services rendered voluntarily to preserve another man's
property from destruction, are presumed to be gratuitous and give no cause of
action." This was followed by New Orleans, etc., R. R. v. Turcan, 46 La. Ann.
155, I5 So. 187 (r894), at least so far as the building up a broken levee, rather
than its repair before a threatening flood is concerned. This is doubtless one
example of the inroads the common law has been making on the old law of that
state.
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action of more slowly moving circumstances? A's legal obligation to
act is not one whit increased by a crisis to B. B's absence of legal
or moral duty to save his own property is likewise not altered by it.
B's benefit from the saving of his property will be no greater than
if it would surely have been destroyed by slow rot, for instance, had
A not come in to save it. The public, also, has no greater interest
in its preservation from sudden destruction than from other modes of
demolition. True, B is more helpless, and the certainty of loss is
greater as well as its immediacy. But on the favorite argument of
many courts that B's request must precede A's action, how is A
any more justified in acting by that circumstance?
It seems that A's warrant for acting is readily found by the courts
for several reasons: (i) There is no time for B himself to act in his
own behalf, or for A to consult with him. (2) The great necessity
for instant action, and the certainty of immediate loss to B, if it is
not taken, subtracts from the usual importance of formal request.
(3) A's intent will be presumed to be to make B a gift of his services
in any case, and that being so, all possible objection to his acting
ceases. Theoretically, and in a merely colloquial sense of the term,
it may be possible for one to be officious by being too forward in acts
of kindnes§ that ask for no money return, but such a use of the word
can, in the nature of things, find no application in the law. At least,
it will never be necessary for a court to weigh the defense of officiousness, or to characterize an act as officious, where the actor at the
time he acted, in fact intended a gift, or what is the same thing, where
the court follows the consistent policy of conclusively presuming
that he so intended. A reading of these cases will show that the
word "officious" is conspicuous by its absence. Therefore, this third
reason is alone quite sufficient to take care of these cases of emergency,
where courts are satisfied to dispose of them in this manner.
But there is a series of rather late cases in the field of tort, where
the courts do not follow this line of reasoning, but where they reach
the opposite result of allowing A to recover. They do this under
circumstances of emergency like the following: B (a railroad),
through the negligent operation of its servants, is threatening instant
disaster to the life or limb or property of C. A, seeing the danger,
voluntarily and on impulse, intervenes to avert the harm to C, and
thereby (unconsciously, perhaps, in most cases) confers a benefit
upon B by saving it from the consequences of its own negligence.
This benefit is specially pointed out by the courts in some cases and
is made an important factor in justifying A's recovery from B.
Was A requested by B to act as he did, or must A be considered a
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pure volunteer? It is granted, of course, that he was under no legal
obligation to act, and any motive of self-protection or self-interest
would counsel him not to act. It might be said, and sometimes is
argued, that B's request is inferred to have been actually made by
simply considering that B must have known from the first that, if
such a dangerous situation should ever be caused by its employees,
any one in A's position would respond to it as A did. But in Eckert v.
Long Island R. R.40 no account is taken of such "request." A is said
by the majority opinion to have had "a duty of important obligation"
to rescue the child on the track. It accorded him damages against
the railroad which had negligently imperilled the child in whose
rescue he was injured. The dissenting opinion denies any such legal
duty, and says the act was "voluntary" but lawful, praiseworthy,
and not a trespass on B's property. 4' Like the Eckert case is Wagner v.
InternationalRy.,4 where Cardozo, J., not only sees no such request
by B, but regards it as immaterial: "The wrongdoer may not have
foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had."
A much quoted remark in this case is: "Danger invites rescue." The
43
Wagner case is followed by Laufer v. Shapiro.
It is not merely the high regard the law has for human life that
brings forth such decisions, for the same holding occurs in cases
where A voluntarily saves C's property from the results of B's
44
negligence: Liming v. Illinois Central R. R.
The general drift of the thought in these cases clearly is that A is
a mere volunteer, that no legal duty rests upon him, and that the
only "request" that is thought of is one that the law will imply.
There is no hint that A's act could be "officious," and this is because
his act was done under a strong moral urge, and was reasonable,
natural, and proper under the circumstances. It is not required that
A's act should have been instinctive, or instantaneous, or reflex, but
if, having had time to reflect, he then acted as a reasonable man
4
would act, he may recover from B. 4043 N. Y. 502 (1871), cited with approval in POLLOCK, TORTS (12th ed. 1923)
See also (1911) 24 HARv. L. REv. 407; (1917) 27YALE L. J. 415; ibid. 96o.

481.

4lCf.
42232

supra p.

32.

N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437

(1921).

43210 App. Div. 436, 206 N. Y. Supp. 189 (Ist. Dept. 1924). See also Brandon
v. Osborn, Garrett & Co., [1924] I K. B. 548.
4481 Iowa 246, 47 N. W. 66 (189o).
It was also held in Glanz v. C. M. &
St. P. Ry., 119 Iowa 611, 93 N. W. 575 (1903). Contra: Taylor v. Home Tel.
Co., 163 Mich. 458, 128 N. W. 728 (I9IO). See criticism in (1911) 24 HARv. L.
REv. 406.
4
1These tort cases are not cited because they are thought to be analogous to
the quasi contract cases (of course they are not), but merely to show how some
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8. Justifiable intervention limited to a "proper" or "appropriate"
person: There seems to be nothing in the Roman law. corresponding
to this requirement, attention there being centered rather upon the
necessity and utility of the act than upon the person or qualifications
of the actor. In the English law there is not a great deal said in
the cases about "proper person," and most of that seems to be said
in cases where B's wife has died while living apart from him and
some one has undertaken her burial. There seems, in such a case,
to be a divergence in point of view among the courts as to whether,
in a matter so personal to B, and where the claims of sentiment are
so great, it is not proper to limit intervention to one whom B would
favor on account of nearness of kinship to him or deceased. Other
courts, regarding first of all the interests of the public and the
urgency of the matter, state that any one who will undertake the
burial will be acceptable. This is rather apt to be said in the case
of poor persons, however, where there is little or no estate, and
consequently a dearth of volunteers might be expected. Such conjuncture, threatening both the public funds and the public's sense of
decency and fitness, makes the requirement of "proper person" of
little moment.

46

of the liberal courts are thinking upon the subject of "volunteer," "request,"
and
"emergency."
46
Hildebrand v. Kinney, 172 Ind. 447, 87 N. E. 832 (I9O9)-relatives or strangers may perform such services; Cunningham v. Reardon, 98 Mass. 538 (1868)stranger acts-no question made of proper person; Gleason v. Warner, 78 Minn.
4o5, 8I N. W. 2o6 (i899)-"whoever reasonably performs the duty for him,"
i. e., B, may recover; Duval v. Laclede County, 21 Mo. 396 (i855)-Scott, J.,
dissenting: "For the sake of humanity, it [the law] intended that every man [my
italics] who would bury the decaying bodies of the poor, should be paid;" Cape
Girardeau Bell Tel. Co. v. Hamil, 16o Mo. App. 521, 140 S. W. 951 (1911);
McCue v. Garvey, 14 Hun. 562 (N. Y. 1878).-"... it is probably the law that
a husband is liable to any person [my italics] who, by reason of his absence or
neglect pays the burial expenses.... It is probably also the duty of any person
under whose roof a dead body lies to see that it has a decent burial;" O'Reilly v.
Kelly, 22 R. I. 151, 46 Atl. 68i (i9oo)-sister-in-law and housekeeper, only
person left to take charge of the body; Jenkins v. Tucker, I H. B1. 90 (1788)"A father seems to be the proper person to interfere, in giving directions for his
daughter's funeral, in the absence of her husband;" Reg. v. Stewart, 12 Ad. &
El. 773 (i840). Cf. Fay v. Fay, 43 N.J. Eq. 438, II Atl. 122 (i887); Patterson v.
Patterson, 59 N. Y. 574 (1875); McClellan v. Filson, 44 Ohio, St. 184, 5 N. E.
86i (1886); Waters v. Register, 76 S. C. 132, 56 S. E. 849 (1907); Tugwell v.
Heyman, 3 Campb. 298 (1812). See Vin. Abr. "Executor," B. a. 24, where it is
said that in case of necessity, a stranger may direct the funeral, and defray the
expense out of the deceased's effects, without rendering himself liable as executor
de son tort.
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That A should be a "proper person" is, according to the view of
Woodward, 47 one of three essential conditions to his proper interposition, and that author states that the circumstances of a case will
not infrequently designate who would be so considered. 4 Such .circumstances appear to be numerous and varied, such as: nearness of
kinship to B or deceased; preference for a certain person shown by
deceased, as by residence or association;48a nearness of location of
relatives more or less closely connected with B or deceased; their
readiness and ability to take proper action; the absence or nonexistence of relatives; B's known or surmisable wishes, if time permits,
and if he has not himself been recusant of his duties; the fortuitous
circumstance of the place of death, possession of the body, local
laws or ordinances; the impossibility or inconvenience or presumed
uselessness of communicating with B or others-these and many
other facts and considerations might enter to affect the question of
the "proper person." As between relatives and close friends, or as
between friends and neighbors, it might conceivably be a close
question in certain cases. Time, space, affection, and regard, and
above all the necessities and conveniences of the case might be
determinative.
Would A properly be considered an intermeddler if circumstances
seemed to point him out as the one to act, and then it turned out
that a more appropriate person existed at the time but had failed to
come forward, or was present and known but did not take the
initiative? This could, it is believed, hardly be true, for the establishment of any such fixed hierarchy of entitled persons would often
either make all action impossible, or so impede it as to defeat the
very purpose of the law in allowing intervention in these cases.
Probably all that is required is that A must not disregard or anticipate
the rights of those persons who are closer in relationship or previous
association with deceased or her husband than he is, and who, by
common opinion, would therefore have better rights than he to come
in, and who indicate that they are ready and able to act.
In view of the great number of conditions and limiting circumstances revealed by the cases, it seems quite difficult to assign any
47

WOODWARD, op. cit. supra note 2, § 193.
481bid. § 196: "Thus, in a case requiring the payment of funeral expenses, a
relative, friend, or neighbor may more appropriately intervene than a stranger.
.. One who, in disregard of the obvious proprieties, pushes in ahead of a more
suitable person, is an officious intermeddler and is not entitled to compensation."
Ibid. § 205: "One who pushes forward without justification to pay such expenses
is an officious meddler ......
48aIn re Tangerman's Estate, 235 N. Y. Supp. 213 (3d Dept. 1929).
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very great practical value to the concept "proper person" as an
independent test or indication of the fact or degree of A's officiousness.
No doubt there is such a thing as a "proper person" to act in every
case, but the difficulty is to say when A would or would not be such
person. The main trouble with its use as a measuring rod of officiousness is that it is itself as variable and incapable of fixed and clear
definition as the thing proposed to be measured. It also seems open
to doubt whether the idea really adds anything important to the
already available tests of forced service and reasonable, useful, and
necessary act.
Several prominent cases often cited as being instances of "improper" person have some interest at this point. In Quinn v. Hill, 41 a
daughter died under A's (her mother's) roof, where the daughter
and her husband, B, had been living. It does not appear that B
was not able, ready, and willing to provide a funeral suitable to his
means, but A, in the presence of B, assumed complete charge, ordering
an expensive funeral, as the final mark of her affection and the last
thing she could do for her daughter. The court deemed this officious,
and an ignoring of B's rights. Consequently her attempt to secure
reimbursement from the son-in-law failed. It seems to be a case of
the proverbial, dominating mother-in-law, lording it in her own
domain without too much consideration of or deference to B's possible
preferences. How much B objected, if at all, does not appear. An
important point to consider would be whether the words and conduct
of A did or did not evince an existing intent on her part to make a
gift of the funeral expenses. It would seem that they did, and if so,
while possibly officious in a non-technical sense (this dependinghowever entirely upon B's known attitude towards her act), she would not
be legally officious unless it is ever legally officious to offer a gift, and
the writer knows at present of no case where such a view has been
held.50 On the other hand, if her intent all along was to charge the
funeral expenses to B, or her daughter's estate, the facts seem adequate to show forced service, or at least that the act was unreasonable,
unbeneficial, and unnecessary as far as B was concerned, and therefore
officious.5
494 Dem. 69 (Surr. Ct. N. Y. x886), cited by WOODWARD, Op. Cit. Supra note 2,
§§ 196, 2o5.
9
Supra p. 40.
1
Iln re Moran's Estate, 75 Misc. 90, 134 N. Y. Supp. 968 (Surr. Ct. 1911), is
practically identical with the Quinn case in its facts and holding. Here the court
found that A did not intend to seek repayment for the burial expenses, and it
calls him "a mere volunteer," which was probably equivalent to "officious" in
the court's intent. In both cases the simple finding that a gift was intended
would have fully disposed of them.
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Another case cited as an illustration of the "proper person" test
in action is Manhattan Fire Alarm Co. v. Weber,52 where A had installed in a theatre, while, X was tenant thereof, some fire-alarm
boxes, approved by the public authorities for other theatres. Boxes
of some sort were required by statute to be kept in theatres. B succeeded X as tenant, and A allowed the boxes to remain in place for
more than a year. B knew of this and permitted them to remain.
During all this time A was trying to get a contract from B to take
them permanently. It is not stated that B had, during this time,
installed other boxes of approved type, but probably he had not, as
he was dickering with A concerning his. B, on this supposition, was
consciously making use of A's boxes though he could have avoided
doing so. B also knew, or should have known, that A expected to
be paid for this use. A contended that "where one voluntarily
accepts and avails himself of valuable services, rendered for his
benefit, when he has the option to accept or reject them, with knowledge that the party rendering the same expects payment therefor,
a promise to pay may be inferred even without distinct proof that
they were rendered at his request." That is admitted by the court,
but recovery was denied A on the sole ground that he had not susIn Fay v. Fay, supra note 46, A, a distant relative of deceased, voluntarily
(without request, and without being obliged to do so) paid the undertaker and
-later sought to be subrogated to his rights against the estate. The court, on the
mere ground that he was a volunteer and had not taken a formal assignment
from the undertaker, denied him relief on the basis of the maxim that "a volunteer
can never claim the benefit of the law of subrogation." [As to this, see the case
of Neely v. Jones, 16 W. Va. 625 (I88O); also the Cape Girardeau case, supra
note 46.] But the court presumes, on the above facts, that A intended a gift.
It then expresses regret that it has to decide against A. Why does the court
regret, if it really believes that a gift was intended? Professor Woodward thinks
that here A pushed forward without justification to pay the costs, and he classes
it with the Quinn case.
Frances' Estate, 75 Pa. St. 220 (1874), and Ray v. Honeycutt, 119 N. C. 510,
26 S.E. 127 (1896), which relies on the former, are identical in facts and result
and are interesting in that where A declared to a stranger before paying the
costs of her (A's) husband's funeral that she did not intend anyone else to pay
the expenses, and that she did it voluntarily out of respect to her husband, the
court, on the ground that A was a proper person, broke the recognized rule that
one intending a gift when he gives cannot afterwards make the donee pay, and
implied a promise by her husband's representatives to repay her. The court
adds: "It is not intended, however, to say that any person who intermeddles
officiously and incurs such expense can recover." See In re Agnew's Will, 132
Misc. 466, 23o N. Y. Supp. 519 (Surr. Ct. 1928), and (1929) 14 CORNELL LAW
QUARTERLY 239.
5222 Misc. 729, 5o N. Y. Supp. 42 (Sup. Ct. 1898). See WOODWARD, Op. Cit.
supra note 2, § 196.

- CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
tained his burden of proving that his act was necessary, in that he
had not shown that B had no other approved boxes in the theatre
during the year. If B had other such boxes on hand, then A has not
shown that his (A's) boxes were necessary or beneficial to B. The
decision might well have been rested on this point.
But the court then adds the following: "But aside from this there
was no necessity for the plaintiff to maintain its service upon the
defendant's premises, as the public authorities had ample power to
compel the defendants to discharge the duty which the law imposed."
Professor Woodward sees in this point which the court now makes
an example of "appropriate intervenor." It is not clear from the
facts, however, why A was not a proper person, or that he had been
officious. His boxes were properly on the premises while X was
tenant. The facts of the case do not show that B had on hand other
proper boxes, and the inference is that he had not. A's boxes were
evidently satisfactory to the public authorities, and this being so,
the latter had no duty to perform, and therefore cannot be said to
have been ousted by A from their right to perform their duty. Even
supposing that B had had other proper boxes put in, in that case,
equally, there was no duty for the officials to perform and no chance
for A to push in ahead of them in performing it. The fact that A's
business was the installing of these boxes would not in itself make
his act officious any more than an undertaker's or a surgeon's business
would have that effect on appropriate acts done by them. At all
events, the basis of the court's decision throughout is the absence of
necessity for A's act. There is no mention in terms of "proper" or
"appropriate" person.5"
The facts in Macclesfield Corp. v. Great Central Ry.54 were that A,
the district highway authorities, being under no legal duty either by
common law or statute, nevertheless made some necessary road
repairs, which B, whose statutory duty it was to have done this,
had, after notice, failed to make. Recovery was denied A on the
bare ground that he was a "volunteer." It is remarkable that the
5Cf. the case of McSorley v. Faulkner, i8 N. Y. Supp. 460 (1892), where A,
the licensee of a telephone, left it on the premises which he sold to B. B used it,
and it was decided that B was chargeable with notice that such use involved the
obligation of the licensee (A) and implied a promise to pay A.
14[I9II] 2 K. B. 528.

WOODWARD, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2io, very justly

criticizes the case as erroneously decided. He says, "the plaintiffs were eminently
the proper persons to intervene." He does not give specific reasons for this
opinion, but the facts suggest them, as the facts make it evident that A was the
local body which, before the act of Parliament was passed, had had the duty of
making repairs.

See also the note in (1911) 25 HARv. L. REv. 77-79.
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court stresses the absence of a legal obligation resting on A, whereas
the important consideration was that there was a statutory obligation
upon B, which he had failed to perform after due notice.
9. The public's interest in the performance of B's obligation as
affecting the question of officiousness in A's vicarious performance of it:
Cases in which there may be said to be a sufficient public interest
have sometimes been limited to those where the general law or a
statute or the moral sense of the community, relating to a matter of
grave moment, demands the actual and prompt performance of an
act which touches in some important way the material or moral
welfare or convenience of society.5 This, in substance, is the strength
of the public interest which Professor Woodward thinks it essential
society should have in B's obligation, in order that A's unrequested
performance of it may be considered dutiful, and thus entitle A to
recover from B. The best example of it, he thinks, is B's legal
obligation to support his wife. Professor Keener, less exacting, does
not require that the public should be particularly interested in the
actual and prompt performance of the specific thing which B is
obligated to do, but is content if the public simply has an interest in
its performance, though that interest might be satisfied by B's
paying a penalty for failing to do the specific thing. It is a difference
of view that finds a parallel in the decree of equity that certain contracts shall be specifically carried out in terms, while the common law
admits the power to pay damages in lieu of specific performance,
though not the right to do so.
It is evident that Keener's conception of "public interest" will
permit A a wider field for legitimate interference. But, on the other
hand, Keener goes further than Woodward by requiring in all cases,
as a condition of A's recovery in quasi contract (though not in
equity), that B's "legal" obligation shall be one imposed upon him
by law (general or statute), as distinguished from an obligation
which B has himself voluntarily assumed by contract. In this direction, it is Keener who narrows the scope of dutiful intervention for A,
at least as far as law courts as opposed to equity courts are concerned.
But, since a limitation on the mere form of the remedy is not in itself
a limitation of the field of public interest, the result seems to be that
of the two most prominent writers on quasi contract Keener will be
found more often viewing A's action in a favorable light.
As to the distinction Keener inclines to make between an obligation
imposed on B by the law and one which B imposes on himself by
OSee

WOODWARD,

note 9, at 341.

op. cit. supra note

2,

§ 194; and cf. KEENER, op. cit. supra
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contract, both being "legal" obligations, nothing of importance, as
it seems to the present writer, hinges thereon. The only consideration
of weight in such cases is the sufficiency of the public's interest in the
thing which B is obligated to do. Whether the source of the obligation is in the general law or statutory enactment, or in self-imposed
contract, would seem to be quite immaterial, given the requisite
public interest in the subject matter of the obligation. 6
Public interest is very like the ocean "without a mark without a
bound;" at one time and place it is fiercely aroused, at other times
and places it is quiescent, lethargic; it includes all things and is
capable of swallowing everything that touches it; it is never still,
but is always encroaching or receding. Can one say what kinds of
business are "affected with a public interest"? There is a list of
those that have been held to be such. Tomorrow the list will be
added to, or subtracted from. 7 So the attempt to measure the
quantum or the spread that an interest must have before it can be
called a "public" interest seems futile. The most one can do is to
say that up to the present the courts generally have been apt to
hold that this is or is not a matter of public interest, or that has or
has not enough of public importance about it to be so classed. If
the public is vitally interested in preserving life in a human being,
in safeguarding his health, and in promptly and decently disposing
of his dead body, it is also true that it has an important interest, in
civilized countries, in the honesty of business transactions; the scru"See

KEENER,

op. cit. supra note 9, at 344-347, for his views on the case of

Force v. Haines, and his criticism of Forsyth v. Ganson, at 351-2, and compare
comment on the latter case in WOODWARD, op. cit. supra note 2, § 209, where the
author treats a contract to furnish necessaries of life on the same plane with cases
where a legal obligation rests on B to support his wife. Keener's argument (p. 351)
that B's contract gives no rights to A is true, if by "rights" is meant "contract
rights," but that is wholly indecisive of the possibility of A's acquiring quasi
contractual rights against B by unofficious performance of B's contract with
resulting benefit to B. That sort of argument seems to involve Keener in the
same mistake some courts have been laboring under through confusing the
requirements of contract with those of quasi contract law. As to his further
argument that in the absence of a contract B would have been under no obligation at all, it is clear, even in cases of providing necessaries to B's wife, that if B
had not by a contract taken upon himself the duties of a husband he would not
have occupied "a position in consequence of which the law" has "imposed the
obligation upon him, and therefore, in the absence of a contraot obligation on his
part, it would have been necessary for the public, and not the defendant, to
render the service in question."
57
See Robinson, The Public Utility: A Problem in Social Engineering (1928)
14 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 8, 9; Robinson, The Public Utility Concept in
American Law (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 277, 282.
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pulous and prompt performance of contracts; transportation; food
supply; education; the protection and well being of domestic animals 8
and game; proper housing; amusements; and a host of other things.
One thing seems indubitable, and that-is that the list of things in
which the public is considered to have an important interest is
growing larger, not smaller. This will have its effect upon the
decisions of courts as to what A may justifiably do in B's affairs
without request, and yet without officiousness. Given, then, a
sufficient public interest, it results, with hardly any dissent, that
B's request or consent for A to act is never required, contract is
hardly mentioned, and A is allowed to force himself upon B as his
creditor,provided only that B was in blameworthy default, or unable
to perform his obligation promptly. Even a prior express dissent by
B will not make A's performance officious.
io. The interrelation between public interest and benefit to B, and
the place of each in determining A's officiousness in performing B's
obligation: We have here three factors to correlate, and we must
attempt to assign to each its proper weight as affecting the question
of A's officiousness in performing B's obligation. They are: (i) public
interest in B's obligation of a sufficient strength to bring A in; (2) B's
inability or blameworthy default in not performing such obligation;
(3) the benefit conferred by A's performance of B's obligation.
The extraordinary interest the public has in certain acts required
of B has the appearance of setting such acts apart in a separate class,
which is not amenable to the strict rules often applied in other cases.
B is the person obligated to act, but in any event some one must take
care of the situation in the public's interest or the public will suffer.
When it becomes reasonably certain that B will default, A may act
for him and acquire rights against B, because society through its
established agencies, the courts, says that A's act is reasonable, and
beneficial and necessary, and therefore not officious. The public's
benefit from A's act is what is first and most considered and is what
justifies A. But how is a benefit to C (the public), on any principle
of quasi contract, to avail A at all when he is not to recover from C,
the beneficiary of his act, but from B? Is it not essential to show that
B also has had benefit from A's act? It is, if we are to stay within
the realm of quasi contract, and not to be forced to explain these
cases upon some other principle of the law. Here the courts, with
almost no dissent, will imply B's request or consent to A's act and
158 n the case of animals there is a definite public interest. See editorial, Animal
Week and Bergk, New York Times, Apr. 13, 1929; WOODWARD, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 197, n. 3.
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his promise to repay A's advances. This can only be so because
justice requires .the implication, which is equivalent to saying that
B is morally obligated to repay A. This moral obligation can arise
here only because B has received a benefit from A.
But it is not always clear just how benefit to B is to be shown.
Suppose, in addition to the merely negative conduct of defaulting
in his obligation, B should in advance of A's act convey to A his
express refusal to A's acting for him and to repay A if he did act in,
we will say, supplying the food to B's wife which B ought to supply.
Suppose, further, that B loathes his wife and can easily evade any
present or future legal obligations to her by going abroad to live,
and that he prefers to live abroad, anyway, and intends to go immediately with all his property. There is still B's legal obligation to
feed his wife, but he cares nothing at all about that. The fulfillment
of such legal obligation by himself or another would afford him no
pleasure or satisfaction, but would be regarded by him as merely a
loss of money. If A, upon these facts, supplies B's wife with necessaries, how can benefit to B be shown?
It is taken to be a fundamental and self-evident proposition that
the performance of B's legal obligation is necessarily a benefit to him.
Why so? In the case supposed, is it on some merely moral ground,
as that, even though B actually would think it a loss of money if he
were made to repay A, yet he ought to feel differently and feel himself
to be a better man morally if he repays A, and that the court, on the
basis of this supposititious moral feeling in B, will therefore conclusively presume him to have been benefited?5 9
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WOODWARD, op. cit. supra note 2, § 198, does not see the benefit as being of
this moral sort, but describes it as material: "[lilt saves him the necessity either of
performing the duty himself or of paying the penalty of non-performance." But
in the case supposed, it is not A's act of performance of B's duty that saves B
from the necessity either of performing it himself or of paying the penalty of not
performing it, but rather his escape to a foreign country or a sister state. It is
self-help, not A's help, that gives B his benefit.
Possibly a court would deny B any satisfaction he might feel in having helped
himself by holding that one cannot have advantage of his own wrong, and that
thus it must be considered that it is, after all, A's performance that benefited B.
This would merely be substituting a desired legal result (no doubt a good one)
for the actual facts or the conclusion that the science of physics would draw from
them. It would thus appear that there might be considered to be exceptions to
the rule that A's performance of B's legal obligation is necessarily a benefit to B.
But even supposing that B remained within the jurisdiction where A is performing his obligation for him in installment fashion, what is the nature of the
benefit A renders B? By the exact wording of the rule it is only of the "necessity
...of performing the duty himself" or of paying the penalty, etc., of which B is
relieved. The legal liability for the support of his own wife remains throughout,
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In spite of the suggestions made in the preceding note, it is quite
probable that most courts would say that A has conferred a benefit
on B by performing his legal obligation for him. They no doubt
see the clear necessity for so holding, if the case is to be decided on
the principles of quasi contract. It follows inevitably, even in the
strongest type of public interest case, where no doubt the public's
interest is paramount in the mind of the court, that it is nevertheless
considered indispensable that B, as well as the public, should have a
benefit before the court will imply B's promise to reimburse A for his
outlay. That is to say, even the strongest public interest or advantage
will not, if standing alone, be enough to persuade the court to force
a promise into B's mouth, and, to borrow a phrase, "in spite of his
teeth." So important is this benefit element that, as we have just
seen, the courts find it necessary to keep on hand a manufactured
benefit that will answer the purpose-one which the plain facts will
often show B not to want nor to consider a benefit at all, or which
the facts will show does not come to B from A, but is a benefit to
which B has helped himself by an exit from the jurisdiction cum bonis
catallisque. In other words, this benefit, if taken in a material sense,
is distinctly a second-rate affair, considering B's own distaste for it,
his power of avoiding his obligation, and the doubt as to the real
source of the benefit. But, nevertheless, for theory's sake the benefit
must be provided. With these considerations in mind, the point
which the writer desires to make is simply this: If, even in a case
where the public's interest is superlative, the element of benefit to
B is none the less indispensable, and the sine qua non of recovery,
and if it stands by itself apart and quite independent of the factor of
public interest as the basis upon which alone A can establish a quasi
contractual claim against B, it seems an idle thing for a court" to
say in a case where B has received from A and retained a clear
material benefit, undoubtedly useful to B and admitted by him to
doubtless, on B, unless it is true that another can satisfy a legal obligation which
the law says B himself must satisfy. What would happen if B's wife, immediately
after receiving from A a month's installment of provisions, should sue B for divorce
on the ground that he was failing to provide for her? By furnishing one installment, A doe! not protect B from the penalty of failing to provide further installments. It seems, then, that whatever benefit there is to B comes largely, if not
wholly, from the fact that his wife does not choose for the moment to complain
against him.
"See Renss Glass Factory v. Reid, 5 Cow. 587 (N. Y. 1825); Falcke v. Scottish
Imperial Ins. Co., discussed supra at p. 26. Cases contra and making benefit
received the real test, or the one to be most considered, are: Todd v. Martin,
xO4 Calif. xviii, 37 Pac. 872 (1894); Baggerly v. Bainbridge State Bank, 16o
Ga. 556, 128 S.. E. 766 (1925); Edler v. Hood, 38 Ill. 533 (1865); Morrison v.
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be advantageous-a benefit which was not officiously, but reasonably
given, and intended by A at the time to be paid for-that such a
benefit does not in the English law, "if standing alone, create any
obligation to repay the expenditure."
What, then, is the effect to be given to public interest and B's
legal obligation, as an answer to the question of A's officiousness?
It is believed that public interest has its legitimate effect in this only,
that it permits A, if in other respects his action is proper, to perform
B's obligation even against B's known or express dissent. Where
B's dissent is not expressed, or A does not know of it, or is not
chargeable with knowledge of it, it is believed that public interest
existing in B's obligation does not require that these cases should be
treated as a separate class to be judged by other and different criteria, but that benefit to B, properly rendered, and retained where
its return was possible, is the proper test here, as elsewhere, of A's
officiousness.
It is tentatively suggested, from the point of view of equity, that
public interest, when sufficiently intense, might be employed to work
out a sort of subrogation, thus: B owes a duty to the public to
support his wife and decently and promptly to inter her dead body.
In principle, and apart from technical details, it is a debt to the
public. On B's threatened default, A voluntarily satisfies B's debt
at the creditor's instance. This is also a benefit to B, as shown. In
return, it is just that the public should now subrogate A to its right
to B's duty of care. It is the same situation as is presented in the
61
railroad tort cases referred to above.
As to B's legal obligation, that goes along paripassuwith public interest in the sense that wherever there is a very strong public interest
in B's performance there will always be a legal duty in him to perform,
or at least there will be an urge upon him coming from the "moral
sense of the community" that will be considered the equivalent of a
Jones, 6 Bradw. 89 (Ill. i88o); Lomax v. Bailey, 7 Blackf. 599 (Ind. 1845);
Patterson v. Prior, I8 Ind. 440 (x862); Adams v. Cosby, 48 Ind. 153 (1874);
Hathaway v. Winnishiek, 30 Iowa 596 (1870); Police Jury v. Hampton, supra
note 18; Watchman v. Crook, 5 Gill. & J. 239 (Md. 1833); Davis v. Thompson,
i Nev. 17 (1865); Monaghan v. Woolsey, 53 Hun 633, 6 N. Y. Supp. 157 (Sup.
Ct. 1889); McSorley v. Faulkner, supra note 53; Hoover v. Epler, 52 Pa. St. 522
(1866); Jones v. Woods, 26 P. F. Smith, 4o8 (Pa. 1874); Beckwith v. Frisbee,
32 Vt. 559 (186o); Morris v. Morris, 4 Gratt. 293 (Va. 1848); Stanhop v. Ecquester, Latch 87 (1625); Ex parte Bishop and in re Fox, Walker & Co., i5 Ch.
D. 4oo (i88o). See also Medlin v. Brooks, 9 Mo. io6 (1845), which holds that
the law will not imply B's promise to pay for A's service where there was no
benefit to B, and where also B had no legal obligation to have the work done.
"iSee supra pp. 40, 41.
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statute. But B's legal duty goes only to the question whether there
has been a benefit to B from A's performance of the duty. In other
words, you may use B's duty as a stepping-stone to reach benefit to
B, and it will always lead to that goal by virtue of the conclusive
presumption referred to, that legal duty performed must necessarily
be a benefit. It will always be serviceable as a peg on which to hang
benefit, and it will also be useful to stop B's mouth, if he is disposed
to deny that what he has received from A is a benefit to him. But
B's obligation should always be regarded as merely a means to prove
benefit, not as an independent, self-sufficient factor by which to
judge the character of A's act. To use it for the latter purpose will
necessarily entail three bad results from three separate points of
view: that of logic, simplicity, and unity of treatment.
From the standpoint of logic, if one stresses B's duty and merely
derives benefit therefrom, it must immediately appear unexplainable
why this legally presumed benefit should bind B, though he has not
requested the benefit, while many cases still say that an actual benefit
will not bind him unless he requested it. As to simplicity, if duty is
emphasized and benefit ignored, or given second place in "public
interest" cases, that horse goes dead when the journey through the
cases is half finished, for in all those cases where A saves B's property,
or his life, health, or limb, there is no duty in B, in a legal sense, to
save either, and consequently you have to shift to another horse to
carry on through these cases. Here you have to saddle up benefit to
continue the ride. Is it not also flying in the face of the ordinary
facts of everyday life to say that the only way you can benefit a
man is to fulfill a legal duty that he owes? That may well be one way,
but it is certainly not the only way, and probably not the most usual
one. From the angle of unity of treatment, any failure to treat benefit
as the one and sole-sufficient cause for implying B's promise of making
proper return is a direct turning away from the principles of quasi
contract law, the central nerve of which is unjust enrichment, benefit
unjustly retained. Such failure tends directly to take these "public
interest" cases out of the field of quasi contract and place them
elsewhere in the body of our law.
(To be concluded in the Februaryissue)

